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Abstract. Phenomenological realism, in the tradition of Dietrich von 
Hildebrand, is advanced as a promising methodology for a theistic philosophy 
of divine and human agency.  Phenomenological realism is defended in contrast 
to the practice of historicalism – the view that a philosophy of mind and God 
should always be done as part of a thoroughgoing history of philosophy, e.g. 
the use of examples in analytic theology should be subordinated to engaging 
the work of Kant and other great philosophers. The criticism of theism based 
on forms of naturalism that give exclusive authority to the physical sciences (or 
scientism) is criticized from a phenomenological, realist perspective.
Our understanding of human agency and our understanding of the 
ultimate nature of reality (its origin, if any, and its sustaining structure) are 
interwoven. As Paul Churchland observes, if one adopts a fundamentally 
physicalist (or materialist) account of the cosmos as a whole, it is likely 
one will adopt a  physicalist view of human persons. “Most scientists 
and philosophers would cite the presumed fact that humans have their 
origins in 4.5 billion years of purely chemical and biological evolution 
as a weighty consideration in favor of expecting mental phenomena to 
be nothing but particularly exquisite articulation of the basic properties 
of matter and energy.”1 Conversely, if one is a theist or open to theism, 
according to which all the matter and energy that exists (and the cosmos 
as a  whole) is created and sustained by am omnipresent, all good, 
omniscient, omnipotent God, one will have more philosophical space 
1 Paul M. Churchland, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1995), 211.
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for understanding human agents in non-reductive terms (as more than 
matter and energy).
This essay is about the framework and methodology for engaging 
in reflection on divine and human agency. In particular, I propose we 
consider two obstacles that stand in the way of developing a constructive 
philosophy of divine and human agency in the form of what I  call 
historicalism and scientism. Before defining these terms, I  ask you to 
join me in a work of imagination.
Imagine that you and I  are attending a  meeting of philosophers 
and theologians when an  analytic philosopher of religion named 
Kevin proposes to defend a  coherent understanding of human and 
divine agency. Taking up a philosophy of human agency first (that he 
intends to use in developing a view of divine agency), Kevin asks us to 
consider the process he goes through in fixing Allison’s cup of coffee in 
the morning. He asks us to reflect about whether his free agency would 
be compromised if someone had (without Kevin’s knowledge) planted 
a  chip in his brain that would create in him an  urge to bring Allison 
coffee if it ever happened that he got distracted or, due to some irritable 
mood swing, the whole task bored him. Now imagine this objection 
is raised: “Wait a  minute! What about Kant? Or Fichte? Or Hegel? 
Didn’t they make some important contributions on the nature of self-
awareness, deliberation, and causation?” In response, Kevin concedes 
that, of course, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and others, are seminal contributors 
to these matters. And imagine Kevin goes on to plead with his audience 
that he was (like many analytical philosophers) simply assuming some 
standard, common sense notions of agency and familiarity with some 
widely known thought experiments (in this case, Kevin was assuming 
acquaintance with the work of Princeton University philosopher Harry 
Frankfurt). As the philosophers and theologians did not seem happy 
with Kevin’s vantage point, imagine Kevin decides it might be better to 
postpone his account of human agency and so he proposes, instead, to 
develop a philosophical model that provide a coherent way to understand 
the Nicene Creed. But before Kevin can begin to develop his first power 
point slide, there is an objection: “How can you simply use the creed as 
a starting point without taking into account Schleiermacher?”
The above scenario reflects what in this essay I will be referring to 
as historicalism. ‘Historicalism’ is an  invented term for the view that 
serious philosophical inquiry needs to be grounded in the history of 
philosophy such that (for example) a philosophy of God or of human 
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freedom that is launched only by the kinds of examples and thought 
experiments we find in mainstream analytic philosophy is a  very bad 
idea. Instead, such a philosophical investigation should be couched in 
terms that engage philosophical history involving (at the least) Kant, 
Fichte, and Hegel. From the standpoint of historicalism, to engage in 
philosophical theology using the creeds or Biblical texts without taking 
into account Schleiermacher and hermeneutics would be like exploring 
Lamprechtsofen, the deepest cave in the Austrian Alps, alone without 
a map or source of light.
In this essay I consider the historicalist challenge to a constructive, 
theistic account of divine and human agency, along with considering 
an  objection that comes from what is sometimes called scientism. By 
‘scientism’ I mean any of the wide variety of philosophical methods that 
give primacy to the natural sciences; scientism is represented by what 
are considered strict forms of naturalism.2 Historicalism and Scientism 
present different specific obstacles to philosophical theology; scientism is 
explicitly atheistic (or non-theistic) whereas historicalism is compatible 
with any number of theistic positions. But they both impede the kind 
of philosophical theology that is customary in analytical philosophy or 
theology: both are positions that are elitist insofar as they both involve 
a  highly advanced, (special or elite) educated perspective on history 
and science. I  will be contrasting historicalism and scientism with 
phenomenological realism, a  position that is certainly well represented 
in the history and the philosophy of science, but it is a method that (in 
my view) speaks more directly to the generally well educated inquirer 
(one that is educated but not on the level of specialization of work in 
historicalism and scientism).
There are three sections that follow: the first sketches the challenge 
of historicalism and scientism. Section two then offers an  account of 
phenomenological realism as a promising methodology in its own right 
as well as providing a healthy alternative to historicalism and scientism. 
I defend what I refer to as the contextual primacy of phenomenological 
realism and propose that philosophical, historical inquiry (as in 
2  Strict naturalism includes eliminative physicalism as well as philosophies that 
recognize the mental as real but not given any irreducible explanatory significance. 
On the latter view, an explanation of some event may include mental relata but these 
are wholly supervenient upon physical (that is, non-mental) events and laws. For 
an overview of various sorts of naturalism, see Naturalism co-authored by Stewart Goetz 
and Charles Taliaferro.
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historicalism) and the appeal to science is secondary and dependent 
upon what may be called the philosophical climate as opposed to what 
I will describe as a more general philosophical ground. A  third section 
considers the cultural significance of phenomenological realism. 
I propose that phenomenological realism provides us with good reason 
to insure that the practice of philosophy is widespread culturally in 
a  fashion that promotes the love of wisdom that, in turn, helps foster 
the foundations for a pacific, democratic republic. I refer to this general, 
foundation as a philosophical ground. In reference to the case of Kevin, 
I hope to show that his methodology is well justified in the context of 
a general philosophical ground, but he should address matters of history 
and science given certain, specific philosophical climates. The burden of 
section three will be to offer some guidelines on distinguishing ground 
and climate philosophically.
I. A CRITIQUE OF THEISM FROM THE STANDPOINT 
OF HISTORICALISM AND SCIENTISM
There are at least two reasons behind historicalism. The first may be 
referred to with a rhetorical questions: Why re-invent the wheel? And 
the second involves an appeal to humility and solidarity.
Why re-invent the wheel? For all we know, past philosophical work 
may have already established certain philosophical positions. For 
example, perhaps Kant has established definitively that we do not have 
am immediate grasp (or awareness) of ourselves as substantial individual 
subjects who endure over time. If so, shouldn’t we not begin with Kevin’s 
report of his ordinary experiences, but with Kant’s arguments and 
conclusions in the Critique of Pure Reason? Arguably, sustained, rigorous 
reflection would bring to light Kant’s particular reasoning, but there is 
no need for us to approach the topic de nova when Kant has already 
succeeded in establishing a cluster of relevant points. It also might be the 
case that Kant was a towering genius and that, without his aid, we would 
not be able to reproduce and confirm his arguments, but that once we are 
acquainted with his historically significant findings we may come to see 
their compelling force.
A  second reason behind historicalism is that it is a  reflection of 
intellectual humility and solidarity with philosophers and theologians 
of the past. We who are working in philosophy and theology today 
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are inheritors of an  immense body of work historically. There may be 
something cowardly about mindlessly accepting the results of past inquiry, 
but doesn’t humility and an awareness of our working in continuity with 
past thinkers give us good reason to approach our topics historically? 
Arguably there would be something arrogant or a  sign of a  lack of 
gratitude in some field of inquiry to ignore past inquiry. The study of law, 
for example, seems especially important to approach in historical terms. 
To assess, for example, positivism versus natural law theory only in terms 
of the present moment without couching our arguments and positions 
historically seems quite inappropriate (especially considering the ways 
in which the very concept of law involves appeal to past precedence, 
enduring common law, and so on). Why think philosophy or theology 
is any different?
As for scientism, let us go back to the meeting with Kevin. Imagine 
that when Kevin refers to God’s action, there is an objection: What sense 
can possibly be made referring to the action of an  incorporeal being? 
A  commonplace criticism of a  theistic account of divine and human 
action is that it involves a Cartesian metaphysic in which an incorporeal, 
non-physical God causally interacts with the physical, spatially extended 
world. This is purportedly completely at loggerheads with a  scientific 
philosophy, which presupposes (or assumes or asserts) that we have 
a clear understanding of causation in the physical world, but little to no 
understanding about the non-physical. Evan Fales offers this account of 
what counts as proper evidence, a method that explicitly rules out theism:
I suggest that we have evidence-abundant evidence- that the only sources 
of energy are natural ones. Our evidence is just this: whenever we are 
able to balance the books on the energy (and momentum) of a physical 
system, and find an increase or decrease, and we look hard enough for 
a physical explanation of that increase or decrease, we find one. There 
is no case in which, given sufficient understanding of a system, we have 
failed to find such a physical explanation. Of course, such an explanation 
may be lacking for a  time. There are famous cases-e.g., the deviations 
in the orbit of Uranus, and the apparent lack of energy conservation in 
meson decay-that challenged this this understanding. In each such case, 
the books have ultimately been balanced by the discovery of a physical 
cause-here, Neptune and the neutrino, respectively.3
3 Evan Fales, Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles (London: 
Routledge, 2010), 16.
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The success of the natural sciences are a vindication of the sufficiency 
of the physicalist or materialist project of accounting for the cosmos, 
exposing the comparative mysteriousness and opacity of theism and 
theistic explanations. Herman Philipse offers the following critique of 
theism from the standpoint of how we have a  meaningful, materially 
based-understanding of human agency but no idea about how such 
agency would be coherent in the context of the non-physical:
How can one meaningfully say that God listens to our prayers, loves us, 
speaks to us, answers (or does not answer our supplications, etcetera), if 
God is also assumed to be an incorporeal being? For the stipulation that 
God is an incorporeal being annuls the very conditions for meaningfully 
applying psychological expressions to another entity, to wit, that this 
entity is able in principle to display forms of bodily behaviour which 
resemble patterns of human behaviour. In other words, the very attempt 
to give a meaning and a possible referent to the word ‘God’ as used in 
theism must fail, because this attempt is incoherent.4
This objection to theism has many adherents, including Michael Martin, 
Paul Edwards, Kai Nielson, et al.5
Evan Fales presses his case against theism by exposing the emptiness 
of theistic explanations. Fales asks theists to identify the mechanisms 
or tools that God employs in creation. Fales offers this picture of the 
ostensible, scientific inscrutability of theism:
Can God cause things to happen in a spatiotemporal world inhabited by 
matter and (if not reducible to material processes) finite minds? If God 
can, then it is hard to see why, in principle, this could not be discovered 
by scientific investigation (by which I mean here simply properly careful 
and controlled empirical observations and suitable inferences there 
from). If God cannot, then it is hard to see why He would be of any 
religious significance at all. He would, after all, be both impotent and 
unknowable.6
Fales contends that if philosophical theologians appeal to omnipotence 
and omniscience in an effort to fill out an account of the modus operandi 
4 Herman Philipse, God in the Age of Science? A Critique of Religious Reason (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 101-102.
5 For a book-length treatment of this objection see my Consciousness and the Mind of 
God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
6 Evan Fales, Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles (London: 
Routledge, 2010), 2.
9DIVINE AND HUMAN AGENCY
of God, they are engaging in a kind of magic trick:
The theologian’s appeal to these features of the divine nature [God’s 
omnipotence and omniscience] rather resembles the waving of 
a  magician’s wand. When a  magician waves his wand which with his 
right hand, we may reasonably wonder what, while our attention is 
momentarily distracted, he is doing with his left. Appeal to omnipotence 
and omniscience does not answer our question so much as it merely 
repeats it. How are we to understand divine omnipotence? How is it that 
God can do all the things He is understood to be able to do? Or, to put 
the question a bit differently: Omnipotence is a dispositional property. 
What categorical properties of God underwrite it, and how, exactly, do 
they do so?7
The charge that the theistic appeal to God’s power is explanatorily 
vacuous or unacceptably obscure is endorsed by Herman Philipse, Jan 
Narveson, Michael Martin, and others.
II. HISTORICALISM AND SCIENTISM FROM THE STANDPOINT 
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL REALISM
I am using the term phenomenological realism to refer to the philosophical 
method employed by Dietrich von Hidebrand (his methodology has also 
been called realist phenomenology), shared by Max Scheler, Reinhardt 
Grossman, Roderick Chisholm, and, most recently, by Stan Klein.
Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977) is not widely known in 
mainstream philosophy today, but he is very much celebrated by Roman 
Catholic philosophical theologians (including John Paul II) and his form 
of phenomenological realism has a  stability and precision that (in my 
view) is superior to the better known German philosopher who shares in 
the practice of this form of phenomenology, Max Scheler. According to 
phenomenological realism, our primary starting point in our philosophy 
should be a critical study of what Hildebrand referred to as the datum of 
experience as this is revealed to us pre-philosophically. In the context of 
ethics as well as in terms of building up our general account of human 
nature and action, we need to apprise ourselves of what first and foremost 
appears to us as the data that our philosophical accounts need to address.
In order to understand this moral sphere, we must immerse ourselves, 
as it were, in the rich qualitative plenitude of a  moral datum and 
7 Ibid, 3.
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bring ourselves to a  full state of “wondering” about it. We must seek 
to analyze the datum, delve into its nature, explore its relations with 
other fundamental data of experience, and, finally, inquire into the 
presuppositions which have to be fulfilled in order that a man may be 
endowed with moral goodness.
In pursuit of our inquiry, however, let us be on our guard against all 
constructions and explanations which are incompatible with the nature 
of moral data as presented in experience or which in any way fail to do 
full justice to them. Thus we must, time and again, come back to the 
most explicit and unrestricted experience of moral data, and confront 
every result of our exploration with the full flavor of the experienced 
data themselves.8
Hidlebrand is quite explicit about the importance of getting to the datum 
that is prior to our philosophical reflections:
Before we begin the analysis of our topic, some fundamental remarks of 
an epistemological nature are in order. These will serve to clarify further 
the few introductory remarks we have made thus far. This work starts 
from “the immediately given,” that is, from the data of experience. The 
reader will be able to estimate properly our results only if he is willing to 
hold in abeyance for a while all theories which are familiar to him, and 
which provide him with a set of terms which he is accustomed to use 
in sizing up that which is immediately given. I want to begin from the 
beginning, suspending all theories concerning the moral sphere.9
Hildebrand’s form of phenomenology differs from Husserl (who was 
one of Hildebrand’s teachers) insofar as he does not seek to suspend (or 
bracketed) judgment of what is real in the course of his phenomenological 
account of values or persons.
Phenomenological realists like Hildebrand, Scheler, Grossman, 
Chisholm, and Klein are each committed to the reality and integrity 
of humans as agents who act for purposes and with reasons. Moreover, 
they maintain that there is nothing revealed by a close study of human 
agency that agency itself is either necessarily (that is, exclusively) 
anthropomorphic nor restricted to what is physical; on this later point, 
they each maintain that our concept of what is physical is not as clear 
or intelligible as our concept of what is mental (subjective, experiential, 
mind). Their philosophical methodology is therefore not adverse (or, put 
8 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Christian Ethics, (New York: McKay, 1952), 1.
9 ibid, 2.
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more positively, their methodology is genuinely open) to the coherence 
and plausibility of theism.
Consider again the challenge of historicalism, the view that appeals to 
what seems experientially evident have been thoroughly undermined by 
philosophers of the past. Simply to assume we know what we are talking 
about when using (for example) Harry Frankfurt cases of when a person 
acts freely in the absence (or presence) of alternative possibilities is to 
shirk our duty as philosophers to take seriously Kant’s view that the self 
is unobservable (a view shared by Hume, among others) and any number 
of incompatible alternatives (Nietzsche versus Parfit versus Kim ...) and 
so on. Let us return to the case of Kevin. What struck philosophers 
and theologians at the imagined meeting is that Kevin did not begin 
his presentation by indicating why he seems to presuppose (or believe 
outright) that he can observe himself serving coffee or that he has reason 
to believe that he is doing anything (as an agent). Moreover, why think 
that he, Kevin, is a person or self? Why shouldn’t we adopt a Kantian or 
Humean or a no-self account of selves defended by Parfit? According to 
historicalism, Kevin may be sincere, well intentioned, and philosophically 
astute, but he has not undertaken a serious analysis to be evaluated in 
terms of our own contemporary judgments and/or intuitions when these 
are not evaluated in light of the history of philosophy.
Phenomenological realism does not provide us with reasons to 
ignore the history of philosophy, but it gives us a  tool for evaluating 
past (current and future) philosophy and it has a  contextual primacy 
that provides Kevin with prima facie justification for beginning with his 
ordinary beliefs about fixing coffee as well as with beginning philosophy 
with a text from the Creed of Chalcedon.
Consider phenomenological realism and the history of philosophy. 
Hildebrand does not begin his investigations with a  philosophical 
engagement with Kant, Hegel, et al. Does this position fall prey to the 
why re-invent the wheel? position or does it conflict with an appeal to 
humility and solidarity with the past? It is hard to see why when one 
takes seriously the fact that in the history of philosophy itself, so many 
philosophers have similarly sought to carry out philosophical inquiry 
into the nature of the self, perception, values, and so on, without first 
engaging in an elaborate historical preface. In the modern era, Thomas 
Reid, Bishop Butler, Franz Brentano, G.E. Moore, Roderick Chisholm 
and others adopt a method very similar to Hildebrand’s. As Chisholm 
writes in Person and Object: “Leibniz, Reid, Brentano and many other 
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philosophers have held that, by considering certain obvious facts about 
ourselves, we can arrive at an understanding of the general principles 
of metaphysics.”10 Hildebrand’s work is clearly in the same tradition as 
Chisholm’s. So, going back to the two reasons behind historicalism, it 
may be argued that the history of philosophy is more like discovering 
different ways to travel rather than inventing and re-inventing wheels. 
Each generation can learn from the past, but each generation of 
philosophers also needs to test their own views (and the arguments of 
the past) in light of their own experience and reflection.
In my view, phenomenological realism turns out to be in solidarity 
with the past – given that philosophers of the past also appealed to their 
own experience and reflection to advance their own positions. According 
to Hildebrand himself, he is adopting a model of philosophy that goes 
back long before Chisholm to at least Aristotle who, while he gives some 
attention to his philosophical forebears Aristotle summarily dismisses 
their views when it comes to him developing his own philosophy:
I want to start with the moral experience itself. In the same way Aristotle, 
speaking about the soul, says at the beginning of the second book of his 
De Anima:
“Let the foregoing suffice as our account of the views concerning the 
soul which have been handed an by our predecessors; let us now dismiss 
them and make as it were a completely fresh start, endeavoring to give 
a precise answer to the question, What is soul?”11
Following von Hildebrand, I believe that it is through a searching, faithful 
understanding of what each of us knows as persons that we have good 
experiential grounds for thinking that the earlier datum (persons reason 
with each other, etc.) has substantial philosophical importance.
I  referred earlier to the contextual primacy of phenomenological 
realism. Let me fill this out and then propose that the importance of 
the history of philosophy depends on what may be called philosophical 
climates.
I  propose that the primary context that virtually all philosophers 
and theologians do assume when engaging in debate consists in a whole 
series of beliefs and practices that seem indispensable. Here is a sketch of 
such beliefs and practices:
10 Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, (La Selle: Open Court Publishing, 1976), 15.
11 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Christian Ethics, (New York: McKay, 1952), 2.
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There are people who engage in deliberation, presenting reasons for why 
this or that philosophy is more reasonable than some alternative; persons 
engage each other in conversation and lectures; they read papers; eat 
meals; breath; go hiking and engage in other forms of exercise; they sleep; 
develop friendships; make decisions; publish papers and books; make 
jokes; laugh; cry; they sometimes make love; they are part of various 
communities; some have children and participate in large family living; 
some are professors who have students and some are students who have 
professors, while others are independent scholars. They typically find 
each other morally responsible for their actions and those of others; they 
praise some persons for their humility and wisdom and do not admire 
the arrogant and narcissistic. Sometimes these people go to church to 
pray or they may pray silently and (not to leave out the obvious) they are 
born and they will die. Billions of people in the world practice in some 
religious tradition and, in doing so, some recite creeds, meditate on Holy 
Scripture, and so on. Some believe there is an afterlife for individuals, 
some believe that an individual afterlife is possible but not likely, while 
still others believe that it is not possible for individual persons to survive 
the death of their bodies. Last but not least, some people prepare coffee 
for their spouses and quite a  large number of persons adhere to the 
Creed of Chalcedon.
I  suggest that recognizing the above is practically indispensable as 
commitments of persons in community. Arguably, it would require 
extraordinary reasons to deny that billions of people recite creeds or 
to deny that persons argue with each other, presenting reasons why 
one belief is more reasonable than another. And, outside of a seminar 
room or conference in which the topic is Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
with a focus on B132 and A352 and/or Parfit’s Reasons and Persons, it 
would be very odd to question whether a philosopher can confidently 
describe his fixing coffee for his wife or to question the philosophical 
interest in setting out to see if there might be a philosophical model that 
makes sense of a creed that millions of people subscribe to. This latter 
observation about seminar and conference rooms, however, brings up 
a point that should be made about philosophical climates.
In the final section of this paper, I  will argue that Hildebrand’s 
phenomenological realism has some important cultural implications 
in terms of supporting a  just, pacific, democratic republic. But for 
now, I  suggest that such a  democratic outlook is compatible with the 
specialized practice of philosophy in which Kevin (in our original 
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thought experiment) truly does owe a  response to Kant, et al. That is 
because certain sites may be constructed that are dedicated to Kant et 
al. In such a site, there is what may be called a philosophical climate that 
needs to be addressed. Different sites will come with different conditions 
that need to be taken on board. One need not address Wittgenstein’s 
private language argument at a meeting of the Hume Society, without 
there being special conditions that would make this fitting. But consider 
a conference or a site dedicated to the philosophy of divine and human 
nature, and not one dedicated to Kant or Parfit on divine and human 
nature. I believe that there are enough of what appear to be good “common 
sense” reasons for objecting to the Kantian and Parfitian arguments so 
that Kevin (in our thought experiment) need not halt his work to make 
important contributions to Kant or Parfit studies.
Consider, first a Kantian objection; I  indemnify this as ‘Kantian’ in 
order to indicate that it is derived from a standard interpretation of Kant’s 
work, without getting tied up in the details of Kantian texts and multiple 
non-standard interpretations. Here, then, is a Kantian objection: strictly 
speaking, you do not observe yourself because (unknown to you) there 
might be an undetectable switching of selves such that (rather than you 
enduring over time as the self-same person) you are a series of selves, 
constantly being switched and your memories and apparent continuous 
consciousness perishing and being re-created. Obviously this is painfully 
succinct (an historicalist will probably see such a summary as horrifying), 
but it is one reasonable and widely recognized line of reasoning many 
find in Kant’s work.12 The Kantian counter-point faces an avalanche of 
objections: for reasons lying in the philosophy of time (we must endure 
in time in intervals, not from instant to instant as an  instant takes up 
no time whatever), the switching would have to take place during 
intervals. How long would these be? If very brief (a Nano-second) then 
you would be (strictly speaking) a  different self who finished reading 
these sentence from the one who began reading it. In fact, you might be 
the hundred billionth self in the series. This hypothesis seems to collide 
with any apparent phenomenological understanding of the experience 
of thinking and speaking. Speaking of series, if a  self is constantly 
being switched, how would one come up with the experience of series 
or successive changes (like listening to a song)? Even Kant recognized 
12 See, for example, J. Bermudez, “The Unity of Apperception in the Critique of Pure 
Reason,” European Journal of Philosophy 2, no. 3 (1994): 213-40.
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that a  series of experiences is not the same thing as the experience of 
a  series.13 I believe that the prospect of undetectable switching should 
no more dissuade Kevin from believing he is the same person who is 
brining Allison some coffee on Monday as him bringing her coffee later 
that day than he should be skeptical that he is carrying the same cup of 
coffee because God might be continuously annihilating the coffee and 
re-creating it.
What about a  Parfitian objection  – should it prevent Kevin from 
using his common sense case in his philosophy of human agency? Parfit, 
like Hume, faces the objection that he is unable to do justice to the 
overwhelming awareness each of us has as persons who experience and 
act in the world as subjects and who live and move and have our being 
from a first-person point of view. Kevin does not need to, nor could he, 
identify himself (his thoughts, actions or his body) using indexicals (this 
is my body) without having an antecedent understanding of himself as 
an enduring subject. For him to think and intentionally to act on the 
desire to bring Allison a cup of coffee he needs to be able to think and 
act as the self-same individual who is providing another individual 
person a beverage. Imagine a Parfitian world in which Kevin is not a self 
but a series of causally interwoven physical and mental events. Arguably, 
an event is not itself something that is conscious. Persons or things are 
conscious; events may involve conscious persons or organisms but 
an event itself has no conscious awareness.14
These worries are not sufficient to dissuade someone committed to 
Parfit’s philosophy of mind, but they do express prima facie real worries 
that a Parfitian needs to address and they provide some reason to think 
Kevin’s work is not discredited (or tarnished) until he has more fully 
addressed Parfit’s no-self account of the self.
I believe that essentially the same scenario obtains when Kevin turns 
to the Creed of Chalcedon and he meets with the objection that he has not 
addressed the work of Schleirmacher. If Kevin is presenting his work to 
13 In The Critique of Pure Reason A364N, Kant hypothesizes that after a protracted 
period of time, a self might think it has endured over a series of events, but all that has 
happened is that a the data of a series of selves with their conscious states (selves who 
have ceased to be and been successively replaced then ceased to be and then replaced, etc. 
have been transmitted to the self at the end of the series.
14 For an extended treatment of the objections I am raising to Kantian and Parfitian 
arguments see the excellent book, The Conscious Self by David Lund (New York: 
Humanity Books).
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a scholarly society dedicated to the work of Schleiermacher, then I believe 
that the philosophical climate demands attention to Schleiermacher. 
In that domain, it would make greater sense to preface the analytical 
model of the trinity with a critical evaluation of Schleiermacher’s appeal 
to intuition and feeling. It might even be possible to use analytic tools 
to unpack some of Schleirermacher’s monistic tendencies in which 
individuals remain individuals and yet are bound up in some overall 
quasi-Spinozist unity. But while analytical philosophy does need to 
take seriously what I am referring to as philosophical climates, I suggest 
that the bare existence of such climates elsewhere does not overshadow 
or render uninteresting a  philosopher seeking to make sense of what 
billions of ordinary people adhere to.
Let us now turn to scientism from the standpoint of phenomenological 
realism. As noted earlier, let us consider scientism to be the claim that 
the physical world is all that there is; its contents are causally closed to 
anything nonphysical; and the explanation for any event is either in the 
physical sciences or in modes (e.g. the social sciences) that can be shown 
to supervene on or be explained through bridge laws in the physical 
sciences. I think that scientism is deeply problematic for many reasons, 
including the fact that it rests on terms that are profoundly under 
determined. I shall propose in reply that we lack any clear understanding 
of what it is to be physical or what counts as physical explanations, and so 
the thesis of causal closure is suspect from the get-go. Moreover, I propose 
instead that we have (and necessarily have) a  clearer conception of 
what may be called (by virtually all philosophers “in the game”) mental 
causation than we do of physical causation (which tout le monde treats as 
causal relations between mind-independent things –events, properties, 
objects et al). First, let us take stock of the current state of play of scientism 
in the philosophy of mind.
In Mind and a Physical World, Jaegwon Kim writes:
The shared project of the majority of those who have worked on the 
mind-body problem over the past few decades has been to find a way 
of accommodating the mental within a  principled physicalist scheme, 
while at the same time preserving it as something distinctive –that is, 
without losing what we value, or find special, in our nature as creatures 
with minds. (Kim 1998, 2)
This position (of a triumphant quasi or near-enough physicalism) may 
have to be modified somewhat, given the many arguments that have been 
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deployed against physicalism in works such as After Physicalism edited 
by Benedict Paul Gocke, Contemporary Dualism: A  Defence edited by 
Andrea Lavazza and Howard Robinson, and The Waning of Materialism 
edited by Robert Koons and George Bealer, among others. But there 
have been, and there still are, an  impressive number of philosophers 
who share, with Kim, a  confident picture of the physical world, and 
a considerably less confident understanding about how to fit in what we 
think of as mental.
Consider three more philosophers who give primacy of intelligibility 
to the physical world and physical causation. Daniel Dennett writes: 
“I  declare my starting point to be the objective materialistic, third-
person world of the physical sciences.”15 D.M. Armstrong offers this 
classic, succinct statement of his metaphysical position: “Naturalism [is] 
the doctrine that reality consists of nothing but a single, all-embracing 
spatio-temporal system.”16 Here is Michael Tye’s position:
On the naturalist view, the world contains nothing supernatural ... at the 
bottom level there are microphysical phenomena governed by the laws of 
microphysics, and, at higher levels, phenomena that not only participate 
in causal interactions describable in scientific laws but also bear the 
general ontic relationship to microphysical items as do the entities 
quantified over and referred to [in] such higher-level laws as those which 
obtain in, for example, geology and neurophysiology.17
In the wake of such positive claims about what is physical, no wonder 
some philosophers think that the idea of what may be nonphysical is 
suspect.
Stepping back a bit, how clear a concept do we have of the physical 
world and how does that match our concept of what many philosophers 
classify as mental, as featured in the list cited above in this essay: our 
thinking, conceiving, feeling, seeing, hearing, tasting, valuing, observing, 
and so on? Contrary to the assumed orientation in philosophy of mind, 
I  propose that our ordinary beliefs and commitments (as revealed in 
phenomenological realism) offer us no clear concept of what is physical 
or material and that subsequent philosophical reflection on the world 
15 Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 5.
16 D.M. Armstrong, “Naturalism, Materialism, and First Philosophy,” Philosophia 8, 
2-3 (1978): 261.
17 Michael Tye, “Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality,” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 19, (1994): 129.
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and the sciences have not generated any clear consensus on what is 
physical. Most importantly, I  maintain that we cannot even begin to 
try to understand what is physical unless we can trust and understand 
our reasoning and conceptual powers, for without these we cannot 
even begin to consider whether or not mind-independent objects have 
mass, volume, size, color, odor, sound, taste, sensory qualities of heat (as 
opposed to heat as in mean kinetic energy) and whether the physical 
consists in individual things (particles) or events or fields.
Following the lines of phenomenological realism, I  suggest that 
priority of intelligibility and clarity should be acknowledged as the 
mental, and that none of the above conceptions of the physical (from 
Kim to Tye) can be any clearer or more intelligible than the mental. This 
is evident in the case of when the physical is analyzed in terms of that 
which is inter-subjective or those things which more than one person 
can (in principle) observe. Such an  analysis (that invokes the ‘third-
person’ point of view) must presuppose an antecedent confidence and 
understanding of subjectivity and observation (known in and from the 
first and second person point of view). No statements of what is physical 
can be more certain than that which is mental and if it turns out that 
we should conclude that the mental is physical, this will be due to our 
confident exercise of intentional reasons, not due to our substituting 
non-intentional relations for intentional ones. (The latter would be 
impossible without our ongoing exercise of intentionality.)
Let us review the earlier statements by our various physicalists or 
near-enough physicalists. In Fales’ case, surely our concepts or ideas 
of “evidence,” “physical,” “energy,” “deviation,” “energy conservation” 
have primacy over what are not concepts or ideas. In response to Kim, 
I suggest that it is impossible to have a clearer conception of “a principled 
physicalist scheme” than you can of a  “scheme” which, I  assume, is 
a concept or way of conceiving. And Kim’s statement as a whole seems 
to commit him solidly to the reality of the mental; “accommodating” 
and “valuing,” and grasping principles are mental acts. The point may be 
so obvious as to hardly bear pointing out, but it reveals the inescapable 
primacy and essential lucidity of the conceptual, the mental or the 
reality of our thinking, assessing, valuing, and so on, as opposed to 
what is posited in the sciences. Michael Tye writes impressively of laws 
of nature, and yet we can have no conception of a law of nature unless 
we can trust the reality and reliability of our concepts and the reality of 
mental causation. In this context, ‘mental causation’ would be evident 
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in our grasping laws of nature, of comprehending when it is that certain 
molecular, atomic, nuclear and subnuclear events cause or explain other 
molecular, atomic, nuclear and subnuclear events. We only grasp a law of 
nature if we can trust our reasoning, whether this is cashed out in terms 
of a covering law model, counterfactuals, or we adopt a philosophy of 
causation that recognizes basic powers. This involves the use of mental 
causation insofar as a  person grasps the relevant causal relata, and 
whether the relata is immanent, located in spacetime, or transcendent 
and non-spatiotemporal, grasping laws of nature involves our reasoning 
that if certain antecedent and contemporary events obtain then there 
is reason to believe this will bring about (or cause or explain) another 
event. The causal elements in the course of a person’s reasoning may be 
vast and complex, but for reasoning to occur, the conclusions a person 
draws must (in a crucial, ineliminible way) be in virtue of grasping the 
relevant premises and inferential rules. From simple mathematics in 
which we reason that the answer is 2 based on our summing 1 + 1, to 
astrophysics, it is essential that we draw conclusions in virtue of grasping 
reasons and entailments or inferential relations.
While the following seems to be mind-numbingly obvious, it seems 
to be overlooked or under-appreciated: microphysics, geology, and 
neurophysiology cannot be practiced unless there are microphysists, 
geologists, and neurophysiologists, and each of them must necessarily 
work with concepts, observations, theories, being able to grasp entailment 
relations, the laws of logic, and so on.
Consider an  objection: All that the above reasoning establishes 
(or makes reasonable) is that we must have facility with our thinking, 
reasons, and concepts in order to draw conclusions about the nature of 
the world. It does not mean we understand what thinking is or reasoning 
or concepts. After all, someone might have no idea whatsoever about 
what makes a car go, but she can drive it expertly and get anywhere she 
wants.
Reply: The analogy needs to be pressed further. Imagine that the 
driver has no idea at all about driving, let along all the particulars 
involving roads, wheels, petals, traffic laws et al. She must have an idea 
about a massive number of interwoven practices and how to bring about 
changes in order even to get into what she rightly thinks of as a  car. 
For her to be agnostic or to profess to having no idea why driving a 
car involves her knowing what to do seems to border on us imagining 
a zombie driver.
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What about Philipse and Fales? Both philosophers seem to assume 
that we have a  clear idea of what it is to be physical (material or 
corporeal) and what is different about physical and nonphyscical causes. 
Do we? Can we rightly assume that what is physical is solid, dense stuff; 
it is uniform, made up of distinct particulars, compared to which the 
non-physical, whatever that is, is spooky and mysterious? Actually, 
much of 20th century physics seems to lead us to think that the physical 
world is more spooky than we imagined; consider Bertrand Russell’s 
observation: “Matter has become as ghostly as anything in a  spiritual 
séance.”18 I suggest that Noam Chomsky is correct that “The notion of 
‘physical world’ is open and evolving” and, as I  argued above, that it 
is not sufficiently precise to use as a  lucid alternative to that which is 
‘non-physical.’19 Proposals that, for example, being spatial is a necessary 
condition for being physical seems problematic given the history of 
philosophers (from the Cambridge Platonists to G.E. Moore and H.H. 
Price) who treat spatial things and events as non-physical (including the 
visual field, sense data, dream images, after-images, etc).
Philipse seems to assume some form of behaviorism, requiring a God 
who hears and responds to prayers to act in ways that are similar to 
the way we humans listen and respond to one another. Unfortunately 
for Philipse, even if it is granted that his implicitly anthropomorphic 
understanding of God is a  fair representation of theism, behaviorism 
seems thoroughly discredited when it comes to humans (the anthropos 
is anthropomorphic).20
In further considering the objections of section one, it is worth noting 
the peculiarity of Fales’ first argument which appears to have this form: 
if God cannot (or is not?) knowable or discernable scientifically, then 
God is impotent or unknowable. Imagine we conclude that we cannot 
know scientifically what Shakespeare meant in all his plays. Would it 
follow that the Bard is impotent? That seems doubtful. What about 
unknowable? Perhaps some non-scientific means are sufficient for us 
to have reasonable beliefs about what the Bard meant. Von Hildebrand 
thought that we can have some experiential awareness of God and this 
is of the kind that many philosophers have since come to use in theistic 
18 Bertrand Russell, An Outline of Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 2009), 78.
19 Noam Chomsky, Rules and Representations, (New York: Columbia, 2005), 5-6.
20 See A Brief History of the Soul by Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro (Oxford: 
Wiley Blackwell, 2011).
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arguments from religious experience.21 This, in principle, would provide 
conditions in which one can offer a phenomenological account of what 
it is for persons to experience the divine or sacred.
On Fales’ demand that a  proper theistic account needs to offer 
an  account of how God acts, this again, seems to be an  example of 
anthropomorphism or likening God to a being who is the subject of laws 
of nature as opposed to their author. In theistic tradition, God is believed 
to possess divine attributes in ways that are interconnected. I happen to 
be in the Anselmian or prefect-being tradition and understand God’s 
power, knowledge, essential goodness and the like, as being made evident 
by God’s unsurpassable excellence. I  have defended the ontological  – 
and other theistic  – arguments elsewhere.22 Fales’s characterization of 
omnipotence as a purely dispositional property in search of a categorical 
property is (at least) misleading, insofar as traditional theism sees God’s 
powers (of knowledge and to bring about states of affairs) as basic, 
and not due to the causal powers of any intermediary. Does this make 
them obscure or empty? It is hard to see why when one can recognize 
conceptually explanations in terms of intentions or purposes by created 
persons that are not reducible to non-intentional and non-purposive 
explanations. For the sake of argument, let us concede that in actual fact, 
human beings intentional agency can be reduced to the non-intentional, 
it still does not follow that such a  reduction is necessarily the case so 
that (a) it could not be otherwise or (b) there could not be forms of 
intentional agency whose intentions are not reducible. Fales’ analogy with 
magic therefore seems far-off. Theists do not do the equivalent of sneak 
rabbits into hats. They rather address the very nature of what counts as 
an  ultimate, unsurpassable great or excellent reality; to complain that 
such a reality or being needs to meet the standards of explanation that 
befit beings of less excellence seems wide of the mark.23
21 See, for example, The Rainbow of Experiences, Critical Trust, and God: A Defense of 
Holistic Empiricism by Kai Man Kwan (London and New York: Continuum, 2011).
22 See Contemporary Philosophy of Religion by Charles Taliaferro (Hoboken: Wiley-
Blackwell, 1998).
23  For an  overall look at the relevant philosophical domains, see The Routledge 
Companion to Theism ed. by C. Taliaferro, V. Harrison, S. Goetz (London: Routledge, 
2013). Fales’ demand for the means by which God acts reminds us of cases when 
philosophers insisted that we cannot explain human volition without positing some 
intermediate such as a higher order volition to have a volition, and so on ad infinitum. 
Many philosophers of human agency make use of the notion of basic acts, which do not 
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By way of a  further defense of divine and human agency from 
a  theistic point of view, consider a  final barrage of three, interrelated 
objections concerning the project of this essay and a summary response.
Objection one: Appealing to phenomenological realism only expands 
a  list of what needs to be explained scientifically. Science has shed 
enormous light on our intentional action. But what further science can 
shed light on divine agency? The scientific inscrutability of divine agency 
shows theism to be anti-scientific.
Objection two: Appealing to phenomenological realism entrenches 
us in the status quo of ideas and ideals. It used to be common sense to 
appeal to demon possession. Surely we need a better alternative.
Objection three: Phenomenological realism gives us data that 
is thoroughly neutral in terms of the deep philosophical theories 
historically and in our own time. Imagine evaluating a  Spinozist 
metaphysics and epistemology in light of phenomenological realism! 
There is a long tradition of philosophers who think that some metaphysic 
or epistemology is true or well grounded, but it cannot work in the 
life of practical engagement. David Hume realized he needed to play 
backgammon from time to time to escape his reasoning and conclusion 
in the study, but that did not give him a philosophical reason for thinking 
his ruminations in the study were spurious.
On the first objection, it is obvious that the natural sciences (especially 
brain sciences) along with the social sciences have shed a great deal of 
light on human agency, but none of it has given us good reason (in my 
view) to adopt a  reductionist or identity theory of the mental. This is 
partly due to the problem of even knowing what is physical, but it is 
also due to the important difference between the sciences establishing 
correlations of the mental and brain and other bodily processes and 
events versus identity. The inescapability of the mental actually provides 
us good reason for thinking that practicing neurologists implicitly 
presuppose a form of dualism, even if they profess otherwise .24 As noted 
above, the fact that theistic explanations do not yield scientific scrutiny 
(identifying what mechanisms God uses when God acts) is no more 
require further volitions or intentions. See, for example, Person and Object by Roderick 
Chisholm. La Salle: Open Court, 1976.
24 This is made evident in the essay “Neuroscience: Dualism in Disguise” by Riccardo 
Manzotti and Paolo Moderato from Contemporary Dualism: A  Defense (London: 
Routledge, 2014).
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reason to dispense with theistic explanations than we would have reason 
to dispense with explanations of mathematical propositions in terms 
of logical entailment because such explanations are non-biological. As 
many have argued, there is reason to think theism provides a foundation 
for science and, from such a point of view, it is anything but anti-science.25
Two, phenomenological realism reveals our use of reason to be 
self-correcting and providing a foundation for the critical investigation 
of the credibility of our beliefs. The legacy of von Hildebrand is an on-
going, rigorous self-criticism. As a matter of historical significance, von 
Hildebrand’s philosophy led him to radically oppose the status quo of his 
society, risking his life facing up to anti-Semitism and fascism in Europe.
Third, I propose that Spinoza and Hume (and their progeny) do face 
some prima facie objections as revealed in phenomenological realism. 
Spinoza does need to provide reasons (and he actually does so) for why 
we should set aside what appears to be our experiential awareness of our 
possessing powers to make changes in conditions that are contingent. 
Hume does need reasons for adopting the bundle theory of the self, his 
view of causation and our observations about the world, and (to his great 
credit) he offers such reasons. By providing some reasons in this essay 
why Kevin does not need to stop practicing his philosophy of human and 
divine agency in order to first engage Kant and Parfit, I am not denying 
that Kant and Parfit have provided us with rich and intriguing arguments 
we should pursue on their own. The thrust of this essay is not at all anti-
philosophical; it is simply a matter of knowing what philosophers need 
to do in order to successfully make their case in specific projects.
Limitations of space requires that I  refer readers to where I  have 
employed phenomenological realism to explicitly support a  non-
reductive account of human persons and divine agency. I develop this 
most recently in The Image in Mind, which extends considerably an earlier 
project of defending what I  call integrative dualism and integrative 
theism.26 In the space remaining, I  propose to make an  observation 
25  In The Routledge Companion to Theism, see the entries on Naturalism, Natural 
Sciences, Evolution, Physical Cosmology, Psychology, Cognitive Science.
26  See The Image in Mind co-authored with Jil Evans (London: Continuum, 2010) 
and Consciousness and the Mind of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
A reviewer of an earlier version of this essay asks how one might settle disagreements 
among phenomenological realists. Imagine one phenomenological realist reaches 
the conclusion that libertarian agency is right, whereas another concludes with 
compatabilism. While there is no convenient algorithm to decide matters, I  suggest 
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about the cultural significance of our philosophical methodologies and, 
in particular, the significance of phenomenological realism.
III. THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE 
OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL REALISM
What do historicalism and scientism have in common? In a sense, both 
are elite positions insofar as both require advanced education in the 
humanities and sciences respectfully. Ordinary persons do not worry 
about Kant’s argument about the possibility of undetected switching of 
themselves. Nor does the everyday person suspect that their purposes, 
desires or even consciousness itself may not exist. Phenomenological 
realism, in contrast, treats our everyday, apparent conceptions of 
ourselves and the world as real and trustworthy, subject to critical 
review. A good example of this involves our experience of the world in 
color. A phenomenological realist may well (as I do) come to conclude 
that mind-independent objects do not have the colors they appear to as 
intrinsic properties of the objects themselves, nonetheless the evident 
experience of color gives us very good reason to resist the effort to deny 
that persons actually experience color (or those who deny that subjective 
experiences of color do not exist). Because Hildebrand, and other 
phenomenological realists, promote a philosophical method that takes 
seriously our ordinary experience there is a  sense in which it is quite 
natural that Hildebrand promoted the widespread practice of philosophy 
in culture in which ordinary persons may be drawn to the practice of 
philosophy as the love of wisdom. Arguably, among persons who sincerely 
pursue the love of wisdom with a balance of courage and humility, there 
will be great resistance to intellectual manipulation, an  openness to 
the reasons of others, the fostering of alternative viewpoints in which 
persons may freely assess and critically review. In my view, Hildebrand’s 
phenomenological realism, implemented culturally, would naturally be 
very much in line with what Karl Popper describes as the open society. 
that we distinguish between a  phenomenological analysis of agency itself (the first-
person awareness of oneself when acting) and our commitments or convictions on the 
level of theory. Although it is impossible to argue for this here, my own view is that 
we do experience ourselves as agents in a fashion that gives evidential presumption to 
libertarianism, however this prima facie justification can be overcome by theoretical 
reasoning supporting determinism and compatabilism. For the record, I think the prima 
facie evidence favoring libertarianism is not defeated by further philosophical reflection.
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In this respect, phenomenological realism is helpful in promoting what 
may be called the philosophical ground for an open society.
Hildebrand had an outstanding record as an opponent of the enemies 
of an open society. He was an early and sustained opponent of fascism 
and anti-Semitism before and during World War Two. Hildebrand was 
a  German citizen, though born in Italy who had to flee Nazi forces, 
moving from Germany to Austria, then to Switzerland and eventually 
to the United States. His opposition to Nazism was especially dangerous 
in terms of his personal security in Austria. The Nazi ambassador to 
Austria, Franz von Papen wrote “That damned Hildebrand is the greatest 
obstacle for National Socialism in Austria. No one causes more harm” 
and he proposed that Hitler order the assassination of Hildebrand, “the 
architect of the intellectual resistance in Austria.”27
I do not suggest that historicalism and scientism should be rejected 
because they are elitist or that phenomenal realism should be adopted 
because it promotes a democratic culture. But I do suggest in closing that 
in our reflections on the philosophy of divine and human nature, we take 
into account the cultural implications of our philosophical methods. For 
practical persons, it is impossible to see historicalism or scientism as the 
mainstay for mainstream cultural exchanges. There are and should be 
special sites for specialized historical and scientific inquiry. But there are 
also good reasons for those of us who are philosophers and theologians 
to promote a philosophical foundation that supports an open society in 
which these more specialized pursuits can flourish.
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27 Dietrich von Hildebrand, My Battle Against Hitler (New York: Image, 2014).
